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GROUP I
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PAGE 1 OF 19 PAGES

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SUBJECT Theory and Practice of Warsaw Pact
Operations; Part II: Organization
and Operational Intent in the West
European Theater of War

ACQ [redacted] [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

HR70-14

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Summary. This report provides information on the organization of the Warsaw Pact headquarters in Moscow before and after its reorganization in 1969. It discusses the preparation of statements of operational intent and of operational plans by front operations staffs. It also provides information on the Soviet concept of war with NATO forces, the forces known to Source to have opposed the Warsaw Pact between 1961 and 1968, Warsaw Pact operational plans in the same period, and the strengths and weaknesses of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces as they were viewed by Pact planners. <u>End of Summary.</u>	5	4	3	2
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-2-

Organization of Warsaw Pact Command

1. In the late 1960's, the relationship of the Warsaw Pact headquarters, the 10th Department (or Directorate) of the Soviet General Staff, to Pact members was similar to the relationship between a country's ministry of defense and its field armies; it was not a military coalition. The Warsaw Pact was then no longer oriented exclusively toward Europe; at the time of its last extension, the wording causing the European orientation was dropped from Pact documents. Until 1969, each Warsaw Pact country was represented in Moscow at the Soviet General Staff by one general officer or colonel who was to act as liaison between the Pact and his own military establishment. However, directives and even such business as would normally be conducted by a liaison officer were channeled directly from the Warsaw Pact headquarters to the member nations' ministries of national defense through Warsaw Pact representatives resident in the member nations' capitals. These Warsaw Pact representatives were always high-ranking Soviet officers, and their presence made the function of the Eastern European national liaison officers in Moscow purely symbolic. (The Pact representatives were sent to member countries when the USSR discontinued the assignment of advisors to the armies of Pact members after a number of those advisors were executed by the Hungarians during the revolution in 1956.)

2. During 1969 the USSR decided upon a cosmetic reform of the Warsaw Pact in which each country would assign to Pact headquarters a number of staff officers in proportion to the number of its divisions which were committed to the Pact. (Source Comment: The number of divisions committed to the Warsaw Pact varied from country to country, and there did not seem to be any particular criteria for the percentage of a country's units which were to be so committed. Also, the difference between committed and uncommitted units in time of war was not clear. In the case of Czechoslovakia, President Antonin Novotny, advised by military experts such as Major General Jan Sejna, Major General (fnr) Mamlak, etc., had originally committed more divisions to the Warsaw Pact than Czechoslovakia was demographically able to sustain; however, the Soviets had never permitted a reduction in the number of committed divisions. In the final analysis, all Czechoslovak divisions, including those to be created after Mobilization Day, were committed to the Pact. In contrast, the Poles had never committed more than half of their divisions.) [Comment: Details on the Czechoslovak position will be provided in a future report from this source on the macrostructure of the Czechoslovak Army.] (See para 25 for Source data on Polish operational forces.) Source knew of no special markings or patches for Warsaw Pact Troops.)

3. The 27 Czechoslovak officers assigned to Warsaw Pact staff duty were selected during 1969 and departed for Moscow in the spring of 1970. They included Lieutenant General Eduard Kosmeil, chief of the contingent, and Lieutenant Colonel Bohuslav Zylka, an artillery officer who had formerly been in the Operations Directorate of the Czechoslovak General Staff, probably as an operations officer. There were two other lieutenant colonels in the group but, although Source knew them well, he could not recall their names. Source speculated that the mission of these officers might be to act as command and control liaison officers.

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458

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-3-

4. The 1969 reorganization of the Warsaw Pact did not bring any changes to member countries; it neither loosened nor tightened Soviet control, and it did not give the Eastern European members a stronger voice in the decision making process. Although the defense minister of each member country held the title of Deputy Commander of the Warsaw Pact, the effective use of these ministers in that role was not even contemplated. Source cited the following points to support his belief that no real changes were to be made in the Warsaw Pact command structure:

a. The 27 Czechoslovak officers assigned to Pact headquarters after the reorganization had low levels of professional ability, were third rate operations officers, and were selected primarily for their ties to the USSR (e.g., they had Soviet wives, Soviet origins, Soviet educations, etc.).

b. No structural changes were rumored.

c. Soviet operational directives limited the role of fronts to missions at the operational level. Since the highest level of command in which any member state had participated was the front, there was no need for a joint staff; command and control procedures were established accordingly.

d. A conference of the new members of the Warsaw Pact staff was held in the USSR in 1970 and was announced by the press. There was no mention of a joint staff at that time.

5. Lieutenant General (fmu) K o z a k o v was the Warsaw Pact representative to the Czechoslovak Ministry of National Defense (MOND) until one week before the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia when he was replaced by Colonel General (fmu) Y a m s h c h i k o v . Yamshchikov, who dealt directly with the Czechoslovak Minister of National Defense, was still the Warsaw Pact representative in 1970. Another Lieutenant General (fmu) K o z a k o v was a Soviet political officer assigned to either the Czechoslovak MOND or to the headquarters of the Central Group of Forces (CGF). (Source Comment: It was sometimes difficult to distinguish who belonged to what organization, particularly in the case of Soviet officers at the Czechoslovak MOND, because the CGF at Milovice functioned as a sort of shadow Czechoslovak MOND.) Other Soviet officers whose names were not recalled by Source were Warsaw Pact representatives in the Czechoslovak Main Political Directorate. One was in the office of the chief of the directorate, Major General (fmu) H o r a c e k; another was in the department handling party political affairs which was headed by Major General (fmu) B e c h e r; and a third was in the department handling political, ideological, and cultural affairs which was headed by Colonel (fmu) P r i b y l. One Soviet officer was the Warsaw Pact representative to the headquarters of the Western Military District and was to serve with the Southwestern Front in case of mobilization. An unidentified Soviet colonel occupied a similar position with the Southwestern Front's rear headquarters.

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-4-

6. The supreme political authority of the Warsaw Pact was the Warsaw Pact Political Advisory Council, which consisted of the first secretaries of the member nations' Communist Parties and their ministers of defense. (See Figure 1 for a chart showing the Warsaw Pact chain of command.) The council generally met at least once a year and the meetings were announced in the press. There were no other Warsaw Pact multinational bodies, and military technical conferences dealt with very narrowly limited professional spheres. The staff of Marshal Ivan Ignat'yevich Yakubovskiy, the Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact forces, acted as the permanent secretariat of the council. (Source Comment: Marshal Yakubovskiy was not a part of the direct Warsaw Pact chain of command and, although he had a small staff and posed in public as the Pact's commander in chief, his exact status was unknown and his functions were purely decorative.) In day to day affairs, the highest authority for the Warsaw Pact was the Soviet Supreme Headquarters acting through the Soviet General Staff. Source did not know the location of the Soviet Supreme Headquarters' Command Post or of the headquarters of the five branches of the Soviet armed forces; he also did not know by what means of communications these headquarters were connected.

7. There was a political command channel going directly from the Soviet Army's Main Political Directorate to the main political directorates of Warsaw Pact member armies. The chain of command for operational matters ran from the Soviet General Staff through its 10th Department, which was referred to as Main Headquarters, and the Warsaw Pact representatives at the member countries' MOND's to the ministers of defense. (See Figure 2 for a chart showing the position of the 10th Department of the Soviet General Staff within the Soviet chain of command. [redacted] (Source

Comment: Although the Soviet General Staff was at the same command level as all Deputy Ministers, it was the coordinating agency and thus had decisive influence among its equals.) (See Figure 3 for a chart showing the coordinating function of the Soviet General Staff.) All important decisions which passed through the Warsaw Pact chain of command were entrusted to officer couriers and not to communications links.

8. From 1961 to 1968, there was no intermediate headquarters between the Warsaw Pact headquarters in Moscow, the 10th Department of the Soviet General Staff, and the headquarters of the Southwestern Front. Source heard nothing to suggest that the system was different for the other fronts within the Western European theater of operations; there was never any indication that any other headquarters would be interjected. This chain of command was in agreement with the rules set forth by Soviet operational directives. Fronts were to receive the signal for a general advance directly from Moscow which would have previously informed the fronts which variants of advance they were to use. [redacted] (Comment: For further information on this subject, see the forthcoming report from this source on the Southwestern Front.)

Under wartime conditions, the field element of the 10th Department of the Soviet General Staff or the entire 10th Department was probably to form a field headquarters. During all exercises in Czechoslovakia, such field headquarters, which were also referred to as Main Headquarters, had been located between Goerlitz, East Germany, and Wroclaw, Poland, in sand dune dugouts equipped with tunnels to accommodate trucks and other equipment. Source deduced, from the fact that the location of these headquarters never varied more than 40 kilometers and from a conversation he had in 1965 with a Lieutenant Colonel (fnu) L a n g who had served as liaison officer at this headquarters during

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an exercise, that a permanent, concrete facility must have existed in the area and that the sand dune dugouts were used as field expedients to exploit communications facilities at the permanent site. Source had no further information on this subject.

9. In peacetime, the 10th Department of the Soviet General Staff (Main Headquarters) was staffed by 200 or more officers. It had its own operations component, its combat intelligence component, and an arms and services component; it had a section headed by Colonel (fmu) T k a c h e n k o for the automation and mechanization of command. Source did not know the designation of its administrative divisions, but its highest approving authority in 1970 was Marshal Matvey Vasil'yevich Z a k h a r o v rather than Marshal Yakubovskiy. For the benefit of the press, several other officers, whose names Source did not recall, were cited as Chief of the Warsaw Pact Staff.

10. According to Soviet operational directives, all command authority within a given area belonged to the operational commander within that area. This principle of command applied at high as well as low levels and meant that units crossing from one command boundary to another were immediately subordinated to the operational commander in the new geographical area. On this basis, Source assumed that the Bulgarian Army was subordinate to the Near East rather than the 10th Department of the Soviet General Staff. The Romanians did not recognize Soviet or Warsaw Pact authority over their armed forces and did not have a Warsaw Pact representative at their own ministry of national defense. Source did not know whether they had a liaison officer at Warsaw Pact headquarters in Moscow. In Czechoslovakia, the Air Defense of the State (PVOS) system and the system linking the intelligence directorates were separate from the professional military and the political chain of command. [] Comment: Reports from this source on the PVOS and the intelligence directorates will be issued at a later date.)

Operational or War Plans

11. The Soviet General Staff's operational plan, or war plan, for the Western European Theater was passed down the chain of command as statements of operational intent (operacinⁱ zamysl) and operational guidelines (operacinⁱ smernice). It was passed on to the Czechoslovak staff officers of the Southwestern Front by the Front's commander designate who participated each year in a briefing in Moscow which was referred to as a "complex analysis and mutual briefing." The Czechoslovak participants were the Front commander, the Deputy Minister of National Defense, the Chief of the General Staff, the Chief of the Operations Directorate of the Czechoslovak General Staff, and the Commander of Rocket Troops and Artillery. Soviet General Staff officers attended the sessions. Simultaneously, but at a separate location, the Soviet Deputy Minister of Defense for Ground Forces, General Ivan Grigor'yevich P a v l o v s k i y, discussed training with other Czechoslovak officers.

12. All aspects of political and military developments were taken into consideration in the preparation of the war plan, but the member countries concerned were given only that information needed for their levels of military activity (e.g., front, operations group, etc.). Operational intent was worked out in several variants. A code name was assigned to each of the variants, but Source did not know any of the code names. Missions and targets as well as operational timing

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-6-

for subordinate fronts and operations groups were laid out and identified. As of early 1970, the Southwestern Front had plans for six variants, all of them offensive in nature. Although the variants provided for changes in the overall disposition of forces to fit particular situations, operational intent did not change and was applicable to all variants. The six variants were of only two basic types: nuclear and conventional. Each of the two categories included variants for attack from garrison using complete surprise, attack from deployment when some preparatory measures had been compromised, and an attack in which the second echelon front was or was not moved forward before the first echelon front actually attacked.

13. Generally speaking, operational intent and guidance from the Warsaw Pact High Command (Hlavni veleni) specified what the mission of the front was, and the front operational plan stated how the mission was to be accomplished by front assets. The general staff of a member country, upon receiving operational guidance, immediately started to work on a given variant. In case of emergency at the Southwestern Front, 40 persons could prepare one complete variant of the operational plan in 24 hours. Physically, a variant amounted to an approximately one-meter high pile of manila envelopes and maps. Tactical decisions and data were compiled into a directive-type document known as Front Operational Intent which did not change with the variants.

14. Using operational directives as their guide, the front operations staff, which numbered about 60 men, prepared the statement of operational intent. It included the following:

a. A plan for the distribution of nuclear strikes by day, by suboperation, and by axes of advance.

b. The maneuver (movement) plan of friendly forces up to division level within the framework of a friendly front and including the entire depth of the battlefield area and presumed enemy activity. Neighboring fronts were depicted only summarily.

On the basis of the statement of operational intent, the front commander issued operational guidance to field armies and organic units.

15. After they had completed the statement of operational intent, the front operations staff as a team prepared the operational plan, a composite of the vertical and horizontal organization of components of the offensive operation. The vertical part of the plan included one or two echelons of command and comprised the activity of the various arms and services and rear operations, e.g., the reconnaissance plan, the air activity plan, rocket troops and artillery plan, signal plan, engineer plan, POL plan, and a medical service plan. The horizontal plan was of complex operations of an all-army or combined arms (vsevojskowy) character, i.e., with the participation of several arms and services. It included plans for various suboperations (called partial operations) such as the first mass nuclear strike plan, the plan for the crippling of the enemy air defense system, the plan for the deployment of troops from staging areas, etc.

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16. When the statement of operational intent and a variant had been completely prepared, the documents were approved by the chief of the general staff and the defense council (rada obrany) of the country concerned. Next, the statement and variant were sent for final approval to the Soviet General Staff (the Warsaw Pact High Command). (See Figure 4 for a chart showing the flow of guidance for the preparation of these documents and for the channel for obtaining their approval.)

17. A front's approved statement of operational intent was distributed to its subordinate field armies. Each field army staff received only that portion of the variant which pertained to its role in the planned military operations. Several general staff officers who had participated in the preparation of the variant at front level accompanied the documents and helped field army staff officers work out a field army operational plan.

Soviet Concept of War with NATO

18. All Soviet operational directives known to Source were based on a concept of nuclear war. The following principles basically governed the military policy of the USSR toward its allies and foes.

a. Allies were treated as fronts or components of a larger picture which encompassed Soviet world strategy. In accordance with this rule, allies were not informed of Soviet strategic thinking. Therefore, an effective multinational staff would never be allowed by the Soviets.

b. Surprise - strategically, operationally, and tactically - was one of the basic tenets of Soviet military policy. This implied attack from garrison without preliminary mobilization and using diplomatic deception by launching a peace offensive or calling a peace conference. Refinements, such as substitution of tactical and operational missiles or rockets for the initial mass strike, could be added for increased security. This would replace the mandatory 24-hour preparation for tactical and operational missiles/rockets which might be detected by the enemy. (Comment: Information from this source on rocket troops and artillery will be disseminated in a future report.)

c. The mission was to be accomplished without regard for casualties.

(the third of the reports from this source on Warsaw Pact operations.)

d. Use was to be made of psychological warfare conducted by departments for misinformation at various levels. After the initial mass nuclear strikes, attempts were to be made to present the situation as hopeless for some of the allies. Appeals might be directed, for example, to the French Government, inviting it not to advance its divisions into Germany and inducing it to negotiate on the Rhine. This would permit the easier defeat of enemy forces in West Germany.

19. Indications appeared in 1967 that the USSR was inclined to a certain extent to try to neutralize Western Europe without an actual attack, either through armed intervention upon invitation of persons in the West (as in Czechoslovakia) or through the threat of intervention (Finlandization). At an international military political conference held at the Klement Gottwald Military Political Academy in Prague in 1967, a Soviet vice-admiral, whose name Source did not recall but who was Deputy for Ideology and Propaganda to Lieutenant General Aleksey Alekseyevich Y e p i s h e v of the Main Political Directorate of the

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-8-

Soviet Army and Navy, gave a lecture to the committee for international relations chaired by Professor Rudolf Hoffmann, Chief of the Academy's Chair of International Workers' Movements, in which he outlined a possible alternative to armed struggle. He said that the Warsaw Pact might "through complex political influences undermine the power of militaristic circles in Western Europe to such a degree that the ratio of forces would alter in favor of the Warsaw Pact without armed struggle." The idea was to convince Europe of its impotence and to force the United States out of Europe. (Source Comment: In spite of the above, Soviet operational directives dated 1966 and 1967, which were still in use in 1970, were based exclusively upon the concept of war in a nuclear environment.)

20. In April 1969, the Soviet Main Political Directorate, after much delay, provided Czechoslovak General Major (Dr.) Josef Cepicky, who was working under General Major Eduard Kosmehl, with input data for a wargaming model prepared to determine the overall Czechoslovak defense posture within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. The input data listed the following variants as they might occur in a war involving the CSSR: (The first was considered the most likely to occur.)

- a. War using conventional weapons with gradual transition to general nuclear war.
- b. General, unlimited nuclear war from the outset.
- c. War using conventional weapons throughout its duration.

Comment: All top secret-special importance and top secret-state importance documents on the subject of war with NATO seen by Source referred to a first strike by Warsaw Pact forces. Documents with lower classifications referred to Warsaw Pact forces making a preemptive conventional or nuclear strike in response to war preparations initiated by NATO. In Source's opinion, the input data provided by the Soviet Main Political Administration should be interpreted to make the Warsaw Pact Forces the attacking forces. The reference to NATO war preparations was a thin disguise which did not deceive anyone. It was completely clear to virtually all Warsaw Pact officers that NATO would not be the attacker.) Source stressed that the decision to use nuclear weapons was a completely political one and that no field army commander would be allowed to make it. He also discounted the theory of graduated Pact response, i.e., a Warsaw Pact division responding in kind to a tactical nuclear strike. Although atomic demolition munitions (ADM's) were considered to be nuclear weapons, Source did not recall any special provisions for their use. Their use by NATO, however, was anticipated. The Soviet decision to use nuclear weapons would be made pragmatically and on the basis of what was most favorable to the USSR. Once the decision to use nuclear weapons was made, there was no provision in Soviet operational directives to allow limited use of nuclear strikes. All plans were geared to mass nuclear strikes followed by group nuclear strikes. After the Soviet high command had given the green light for the use of nuclear weapons, front commanders would use the weapons available to them as they saw fit. Gradual slippage into nuclear war would be on the part of NATO only.

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-9-

Forces Opposing the Warsaw Pact

21. Source recalled that, between 1961 and 1968, NATO was assumed to have about 30 divisions to oppose the 120 divisions available to the Warsaw Pact. Of these 30 divisions, 12 were West German, 7 were American, 2 or 3 were Belgian, 3 or 4 were Dutch, 2 may have been British, and an unrecalled number were French. (The French divisions could reach the battle field from France in three or four days.) Two additional divisions were expected to be airlifted from the United States. One American and one West German airborne division were expected to participate in hostilities, but Source was not sure if they were included in the divisions listed above. Generally, airborne troops were considered to be separate from regular line divisions. The South-western Front expected opposition from two American, four West German, and one French division at the beginning of hostilities; these would later be reinforced by three or four French divisions. (Source Comment: The poor military effort made by the Belgians and the Dutch was a source of wonder to Warsaw Pact staff officers who compared it unfavorably with the Czechoslovak effort.) No West German mobilized divisions were ever played in Warsaw Pact training exercises.

22. NATO's greatest political weakness was considered to be its obligation to consult with its various member nations before calling a general NATO alert. In contrast, the Warsaw Pact had the "advantage" of being completely under Soviet control and thus having no need of mutual consultation. The Czechoslovak General Staff expected a delay of several hours before NATO responded, even in case of nuclear attack by the Warsaw Pact.

23. Another advantage enjoyed by the Warsaw Pact over NATO was the Pact's complete lack of concern for damage to its own territory. Pact military planners estimated that, even if NATO were caught completely by surprise, the territory of the CSSR would still be hit by a minimum of 450 nuclear strikes. Poland was the only Warsaw Pact member which had set up measures to protect its own territory and citizens with any degree of effectiveness.

24. In comparing the combat effectiveness of opposing forces, the Warsaw Pact used West German troops as a standard representing the enemy and rated them as 1.00; American troops were rated 0.80, and the Italians were rated 0.25. Source could recall no other information on this point. A Warsaw Pact field army was considered to be operationally equivalent to a NATO corps of three divisions. A Warsaw Pact/NATO ratio of forces of 2:1 was required for tactical success under nuclear warfare conditions and 3:1 was required for success under conventional warfare conditions. (Source Comment: As long as Warsaw Pact troops met with success and continued to advance, the basically unreliable Eastern European troops would continue to march as they would not then have an effective way to desert. However, should the advance pause for over twelve hours, desertions from the ranks would begin and they would reach massive proportions if the Pact forces were to retreat.)

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-10-

Warsaw Pact Operational Plans, 1961 to August 1968

25. Between 1961 and August 1968, Warsaw Pact operational plans called for an operations group of five Polish divisions to carry out an attack along the northern coast of Germany and Holland along the Ludwigslust-Bremervhaven-Emmen axis. Source could not identify the Polish divisions, but he did know that no Polish airborne elements were to be used in the drive. In all military exercises in 1961 and 1963, the staging area for the Polish troops had been in East Germany. Source was not aware of any Polish troops stationed in East Germany, and no explanation was ever given of how these Polish troops were to cover the 200 km from Poland to the staging area. No part of this operational group was to be used against Denmark, and the use of no other Polish troops was depicted. Source had never heard of a Polish Front, but he said this did not prove its nonexistence. Czechoslovak officers themselves were unaware of the existence of the Southwestern or Czechoslovak Front unless they had a need to know about it. Source had never heard of mixing Polish and other Warsaw Pact troops. He had heard that the Polish Navy cooperated with the Leningrad Front (Leningrad Military District, in peacetime), and he speculated that it would probably be used against Denmark. Poland had about 20 divisions of which only 10 were committed to the Warsaw Pact. Source could provide no further information on existing or mobilization day Polish order of battle, on the use of Polish troops or naval forces, on the second echelon which was to follow the Polish operations group, or on the operations of the Leningrad Front. (He had become aware of this front between 1966 and 1968 when the Leningrad Military District set up a Leningrad Front test of automation of command and control.)
(Source Comment: The fact that the Leningrad Military District was actually converted into a front should not convey the impression that all Soviet Military Districts would be so converted in case of war. The Odessa Military District was to be converted into a front directed toward the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, and the Near East. It was highly unlikely that the Moscow Military District would be converted into a front, although it did have an elite tank army. Three fully equipped motorized rifle divisions were also stationed in the Moscow Military District; however, they were subordinate to the Soviet Ministry of Interior and not to the military command. Even at the time of the greatest Soviet reverses in World War II, troops from the Moscow Military District were never used in combat. The tank army and the motorized rifle divisions acted as a security force for the Kremlin rulers. Their separate subordination was designed to balance the military and the police, but that balance had tipped decisively in favor of the military since the death of Joseph Stalin. Three times in recent years - at the time of Stalin's death, when Nikita Khrushchev fired Marshal Georgi Zhukov, and at the time of Leonid Brezhnev's accession to power - the tank army had been called upon during power struggles in the Kremlin to disarm and neutralize Ministry of Interior forces.)

26. The main effort against NATO was to be conducted by the Western or Berlin Front. [Comment: Source did not know which of the two titles was official; both were used in documents to which he had access. He speculated that the Soviets called it the Western Front and the Czechs called it the Berlin Front.) The Western Front consisted of the two axes of advance discussed below. The main force of the attack was to be switched from the less successful to the more successful axis of advance. (See Figure 5.)

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-11-

a. A force of 10 to 15 Soviet and East German divisions (the Berlin Group) were to depart from the Havelberg-Magdeburg area and to attack in the direction of Hannover and Osnabruceck-Duisburg-Liege.

b. The Erfurt Group, which was to consist of ten Soviet and East German divisions, was to advance from its staging area in Muehlhausen-Suhl along the Erfurt-Luxembourg axis; it was to pass north of Wiesbaden, Frankfurt/Main, and Trier. One or two East German divisions from this force were to turn south to Bad Kissingen and Klingsberg to make contact with the Southwestern Front. The end of the first phase of operations for the Western/Berlin and Southwestern Fronts was to be the establishment of a bridgehead across the Rhine River with a minimum operational depth of 50 to 60 km.

27. The second echelon of the Western/Berlin Front was to be formed by 15 divisions of the Belorussian Front. It was to cross the front lines eight to ten days after the opening of hostilities, and its operations were expected to last about ten days.

28. The primary mission of the Belorussian and Carpathian Fronts was the occupation of France. [] Comment: For further details on the movement of the Carpathian Front, see the last of this three-part series of reports on the Warsaw Pact operations.)

29. Source could provide no information on the order of battle for the Soviet and East German divisions of the Western Front. He believed that the East Germans had no commands above division level as of 1966. In May 1967, he was told by Colonel (fmu) R o e h r e r, head of the Chair of Tactics and Operations Arts at the Dresden Military Academy, that the East Germans were not interested in automation and mechanization of command and control above the division level. Source thought, however, that the trend was toward the establishment of East German field armies, because the East German Army was being steadily reinforced and reequipped and because that army had organic, field army-type missiles. East German officers had attended the Artillery Academy in Leningrad as far back as 1963; the East Germans formed an independent axis of advance within the Erfurt Group and required their own missile support.

30. []

(See

Figure 5 for a sketch showing the general axes of advance which would have been followed by Warsaw Pact forces in an invasion of Western Europe prior to August 1968. Source believed that the axis of advance shown for the Southwestern and Carpathian Fronts was accurate as of 1970.)

31. In several Czechoslovakian command post exercises (CPX's) held between 1961 and August 1968, Soviet/Hungarian forces appeared on the southern flank of the Southwestern Front. A Soviet/Hungarian operations group of six to eight divisions advanced in some of the CPX's along the Varazdin-Udine-Vicenza axis. This group was referred to as the Italian Group although there was no indication that it would turn south into Italy. It appeared more probable that the group was to cross northern Italy to proceed westward. In one exercise, this operations group advanced into the Danube Valley. Source's information on this operation group was scanty because the Southwestern Front was no

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-12-

required to maintain operational contact or liaison with it. The tops of the Alps formed the boundary between the two forces. Source could provide no information on reinforcement and logistics or on any connection between the Italian Group and the Carpathian Front, although he considered such a relationship probable.

32. Until 1965, the Yugoslavs were expected to cooperate with or offer no resistance to Warsaw Pact activities. However, it became evident prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 that Yugoslavia was fortifying its border with Hungary. Source did not know what changes, if any, were made in Warsaw Pact plans as a result of the installation of Yugoslavian fortifications. He speculated that the Italian Group might be called upon to conduct holding operations until political action against Yugoslavia could become effective.

33. Source heard in 1968 that Hungary had a total of four divisions and that the Soviets had three divisions stationed in Hungary. One of the Soviet divisions originally stationed in Hungary may have been moved to Oremov-Laz in the CSSR to guard the Carpathian Front's advance storage areas in the valleys of the Low Tatra Mountains. Source could provide no further information on the composition of forces in the Italian Group or on changes in the operational plan.

34. Source was not familiar with any plans beyond the occupation of France. He knew nothing about plans to occupy Switzerland, Spain, or the United Kingdom and he speculated that the United Kingdom might have been the concern of another theater of operations. In one CPX, Czechoslovak troops approached the Swiss border, but they did not advance into Switzerland. The techniques of the second phase of the occupation of Europe were never officially discussed. Warsaw Pact planners expected that, after the occupation of Germany and France, all bordering countries would fall without resistance.

35. Source had no information on any Warsaw Pact nuclear storage areas or on the logistical system planned by the Warsaw Pact to support the European theater of war.

Strengths and Weaknesses

36. NATO weaknesses were considered to be more political than military. The heavy logistical "tail" of NATO divisions was pointed out as a serious disadvantage. It seemed incredible to Czechoslovak staff officers that, considering the number of troops available, NATO had such a small number of divisions.

37. NATO was considered to be stronger than the Warsaw Pact in air defense, especially against low-flying aircraft. Air defense was a serious weakness of the Pact, and its air forces were inferior to NATO air forces. POL supplies were, in Source's opinion, the weak point of Warsaw Pact logistics. Ammunition and food were not subjects of concern, but Soviet forces particularly had a great shortage of tank trucks for POL transportation. Soviet-manufactured field vehicles were famous for enormous fuel consumption rates, but POL to supply this need had to be transported in small cisterns on regular trucks. There was a great deal of talk about field pipeline construction, but Source did not consider Warsaw Pact techniques very effective.

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-13-

38. Pact rockets and missiles were extremely sensitive. When loaded on their carriers, the thin skins of the missiles and rockets made them highly vulnerable to snipers, and one round could disable them. Warsaw Pact planners worried about nuclear strikes ahead of the second echelon fronts, particularly in the case of the Carpathian Front. Surface nuclear bursts placed in the deep valleys of the Carpathian Mountains would cripple all forward movement.


39. All Warsaw Pact countries were weak in reconnaissance. The intelligence information provided was generally factual and definitive, but reconnaissance broke down when troops moved out of their garrisons. Intelligence was gathered by air reconnaissance, artillery air reconnaissance, and by long range reconnaissance patrols. Targetting for nuclear strikes was the primary responsibility of the Pact countries' intelligence directorates, which furnished intelligence to rocket/missile planners. The intelligence directorates were the only source of information available to the military prior to the initial mass nuclear strike. During CPX's, agent reports usually arrived too late to be of any use in the current operations.

40. The communication systems of Warsaw Pact forces were inferior to those used by NATO forces.

41. The Soviet General Staff attached more importance to Soviet political superiority and the number of political options it had than to the purely military superiority which had to be achieved to ensure tactical and operational success. In spite of an official line of optimism, opposing forces were viewed realistically; preparations were made to encounter determined resistance. The Czechoslovak General Staff believed that if the initial surprise failed, Warsaw Pact operational plans were in danger of bogging down. However, psychological efforts were to be made against individual NATO members to take advantage of varying shades of national interest. It was to be considered a partially successful effort if the French were induced to concentrate their troops for the defense of French territory rather than moving them into Germany. The same kind of reasoning applied to Benelux forces. The more favorable positions for effective opposition by NATO forces were considered by Warsaw Pact planners to be near the Bloc borders.

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Figure 1
WARSAW PACT CHAIN OF COMMAND






Figure 2 (continued)





Figure 3

Chart Showing Coordination Function of the Soviet General Staff




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-18-

Figure 4

Chart Showing Flow of Guidance for Preparation of Statements of Operational Intent and Operational Plans and the Channels Used to Gain Approval for these Documents



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